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This paper provides a critical discussion of contemporary policy agendas to raise 
aspirations for university among students from low socio-economic status (SES) 
backgrounds. It traces the politics of aspiration from the working class ‘poverty of 
desire’ thesis propounded by British socialists at the turn of the twentieth century to 
recent concerns about the educational aspirations of low SES groups. These concerns 
are manifest in the current aspiration-raising agenda in Australian higher education, 
which aims to realise equity objectives by cultivating market-rational behaviour and 
dispositions to maximise self-investment in human capital. However, changes in 
contemporary global education and labour markets present significant obstacles to 
the ‘good life’ promises made by advocates of human capital theory, and even when 
these promises are realised, deficit constructions of aspirations persist. The paper 
identifies a tension in aspiration-raising logics between (a) human capital promises of 
economic rewards for enterprising behaviour, and (b) the policing of aspirations and 
associated behaviours according to dominant social values. 
 
Keywords: Equity, marketization, higher education, aspirations, human capital, 
education policy 
 
 
Competition is as much a method for breeding certain types of mind as anything else: the very 
cast of thinking of the great entrepreneurs would not exist but for the environment in which 
they developed their gifts. The same capacity to think will take a wholly different turn 
according to the task set to it. (Hayek, 1979, p. 76) 
 
Introduction 
 
This paper examines the aspiration-raising agenda in current Australian higher 
education policy, particularly efforts to widen participation through the cultivation of 
dispositions conducive to capitalist market competition. Aspiration and the broader 
concept of the imaginary (Gaonkar, 2002) have become central categories for the 
analysis of contemporary economic, political and cultural life in the context of 
globalisation. The increased mobility of people, things and ideas has expanded the 
imaginative resources available to people when contemplating their futures and those 
of their children (Appadurai, 1996). Further, governance in advanced liberal nations 
increasingly acts at the level of people’s anxieties, fears and hopes (Massumi, 2010; 
Rose, 1999), including through promises of wealth and mobility for those who invest 
appropriately in their human capital (Brown, 2006). Such promises can produce 
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conditions of ‘cruel optimism’ for many (Berlant, 2011), as the rewards and 
opportunities of the global knowledge economy flow to a few, while others are left 
striving in hope-sustaining anticipation only to find their position stagnating or 
becoming worse (Brown, Lauder & Ashton, 2010). Aspiration, defined as a complex 
disposition that spans both conscious plans and felt possibilities for the future—a kind 
of ‘thinking-feeling’ (Massumi, 2011)—is now an important locus for the intersection 
of politics and policy across global, national and personal scales. 
 Equity policy in Australian higher education (HE) is currently focused on raising 
aspirations for university among students from low socioeconomic status (SES) 
backgrounds. This agenda has emerged as part of broader reforms that include efforts 
to expand Australian higher education (HE) by uncapping places to create a demand-
driven system. Policy now frames aspiration as a motivational force that can increase 
participation and, subsequently, social mobility for disadvantaged groups, while also 
reinvigorating human capital investment and improving national economic 
competitiveness through increased HE attainment. This current attention to aspiration 
borrows from English policy over the previous decade (e.g. the Aimhigher program), 
which also promoted aspiration-raising as a means to widen participation in HE. In 
both contexts, it has been argued that people from low SES backgrounds lack 
appropriate educational aspirations and this creates a barrier to higher education. 
Such criticism of working class desires extends back at least as far as the late 
nineteenth century in England.  
 The first section of the paper briefly traces the ‘poverty of desire’ thesis that 
emerged in English utopian socialist politics at this time and its mobilisation since to 
explain both lack of political motivation and social disadvantage. Contemporary 
concerns about aspiration have been incorporated into what Rizvi and Lingard (2010) 
describe as the ‘social imaginary of neoliberal globalisation’. A social imaginary is ‘a 
way of thinking shared in a society by ordinary people, the common understandings 
that make everyday practice possible, giving them sense and legitimacy’ (Rizvi & 
Lingard, 2010, p. 34; cf. Taylor, 2004). In the neoliberal imaginary ‘high’ aspirations 
are linked to the project of self-capitalisation through rational market behaviour, 
including investment in education to improve employment prospects. An intensified 
‘politics of aspiration’ (Raco, 2009) has emerged in the context of post-Keynesian 
governance and the rise of human capital theory, which contends that ‘[t]he economic 
successes of individuals, and also of whole economies, depends on how extensively 
and effectively people invest in themselves’ (Becker, 2006, p. 292). While human 
capital was initially defined as the ‘knowledge, information, ideas, skills, and health 
of individuals’ (Becker, 2006, p. 292), the distinction between these attributes and the 
individuals who acquire them has gradually dissolved. Every aspect of life now is a 
potential opportunity for self-capitalisation and ‘human capital as a dominant 
subjective form is a defining feature of neoliberalism’ (Feher, 2009, p. 24). Aspiration 
is promoted as a virtue for this subjective form. 
 The second section of the paper describes the contemporary higher education 
policy context in Australia, particularly in relation to equity policy. The focus here is 
on how the politics of aspiration aligns current equity agendas with neoliberal 
assumptions regarding self-interested behaviour in education markets. Contrary to a 
common belief that such behaviour in competitive markets is innate, as implied by 
policy statements that call for ‘unleashing’ aspirations or potential, neoliberal theory 
holds that the ‘spirit of enterprise’ required to sustain competition must be actively 
produced (Hayek, 1979). This intent is evident in efforts to actively raise aspirations 
for university. While this agenda is legitimised primarily in terms of increasing 
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equity, it seeks to do so by encouraging the ‘cast of thinking’ that is required for 
market competition. 
 The final section of the paper examines the tensions between market logics and 
cultural politics in this agenda. It considers the affective terrain on which aspirations 
are formed, and the relation of ‘cruel optimism’ that arises when objects of desire that 
sustain people’s life projects simultaneously undermine them (Berlant, 2011). This 
relation is an increasingly likely outcome of the ‘neoliberal opportunity bargain’ 
described by Brown et al. (2010), which promises economic rewards to those who 
pursue human capital investment through higher education. These promises are 
proving more difficult to keep in contemporary global labour markets. Further, groups 
who avoid this ‘opportunity trap’ and achieve economic mobility without higher 
education still find themselves criticised for holding the ‘wrong’ aspirations. The 
paper concludes by considering possibilities for moving beyond the politics of 
aspiration. 
 
 
From the poverty of desire to the politics of aspiration 
 
At the turn of the twentieth century, in a short pamphlet titled The straight tip to 
workers: Brains better than bets or beer, English socialist politician John Burns 
decried that: 
 
So far the workmen have failed to realise their duty and the responsibility of industrial 
citizenship. Securing a few crumbs of reform, they are content—not asking too much is their 
fault. The curse of the working class is the fewness of their wants, the poverty of their desires, 
the overloading of a few sensuous tastes, the absence of a varied set of elevated and healthy 
desires. This must not be; if it is to be all the predictions of the enemies of Democracy will be 
justified. (Burns, 1902, pp. 12-13) 
 
Burns believed that members of the working class were too easily satisfied with 
leisure activities that provided temporary release from oppressive working conditions 
(Waters, 1990). This ‘poverty of desire’ was perceived to be an obstacle to building 
popular political support for socialism. The British socialists felt it was their 
responsibility to educate the desires of the working class, through the publication of 
utopian fiction and the provision of more cultivated forms of leisure, in order to 
encourage ‘higher tastes’ and to stimulate transformative political aspirations (Waters, 
1990).  
 The desires of the working class have been a matter of concern in British and 
Australian politics ever since. In the middle of last century, British Labour politician 
Ernest Bevin revived the ‘poverty of desire’ thesis, criticising the British working 
class for their satisfaction with gradual improvements in basic living standards, rather 
than desiring more rapid and radical change during the post-war period (Roebuck, 
1973, p. 162). More recently, New Labour in the UK fashioned their ‘third-way’ 
political strategy in response to the aspirations of an upwardly mobile section of the 
working class. Tony Blair argued that this group of aspirational voters perceived 
Labour policies to be holding them back, and it was therefore important for Labour to 
combat shifting allegiances toward the Conservative party, which Blair believed to be 
a factor in Labour’s 1992 electoral defeat (Johnson, 2004). This belief also permeated 
the Australian Labor Party at the turn of the twenty-first century, and was particularly 
evident in the policy positions set out by former leader Mark Latham. Johnson (2004) 
notes that ‘[o]ne of the strongest Blairite influences on Latham [was] the key 
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emphasis on attracting aspirational suburban voters’ (p. 543). Indeed, Latham (2003, 
p. 68) argued that economic ‘[o]wnership and aspiration need to be at the heart of 
Labor’s policy platform’. 
 From Burns to Latham, the poverty of desire thesis evolved from an argument 
about political motivations to one about social mobility. While Burns and Bevin 
criticised an apparent lack of political zeal among the working class, Blair and 
Latham courted a class fraction who distinguished themselves through their consumer 
aspirations. At this time, in Australia, the ‘aspirationals’ were popularly identified 
with large outer-suburban homes, private education, and consumer goods such as 
large-screen televisions (Goot & Watson, 2007). Where the British socialists argued 
that ‘any poverty of desire was usually the result of an emerging consumer society 
which blocked the expression of the innate desire for genuine pleasure’ (Waters, 
1990, p. 47), Blair and Latham presented the desire for economic ownership as an 
important motivational force for social change: ‘The ownership revolution is here to 
stay. Aspirational politics is a logical consequence of this reality’ (Latham, 2003, p. 
68). This aspirational politics emerged in the context of advanced liberalism and the 
growing equation of citizenship with appropriate consumption practices (Bauman, 
2005; Rose, 1999). 
 Aspiration has now become an important site of contemporary governmentality 
(Foucault, 2000). Raco (2009) argues that, since the election of the Blair government 
in 1997, social policy in England has focused on developing ‘aspirational citizens’ 
who take responsibility for improving themselves, their communities and, ultimately, 
their nation. In contrast to the welfare state ‘politics of expectation’ and its emphasis 
on state-sponsored redistribution, the new politics of aspiration targets the potential of 
consumer-citizens as a fuel for economic productivity and social mobility. Raco 
(2009, p. 437) argues that this is an ‘existential politics … through which dominant 
social values are defined and institutionalised’. Aspiration-focused policy partitions 
society into those who aspire appropriately and those who do not, while a broader 
cultural politics renders only a select set of desires visible as ‘aspirational’. 
 In the neoliberal imaginary, aspirations to pursue self-maximisation through 
education and subsequent advancement through labour market opportunities appear 
self-evidently ‘high’. People who do not act in ways that demonstrate their pursuit of 
these aspirations are perceived to lack the information required to appreciate the 
benefits of self-capitalising behaviour, or, more simplistically, to be lazy and 
recalcitrant citizen-consumers who hold anachronous expectations of state provision: 
‘bludgers’ who suffer from a poverty of desire that is often considered even more dire 
than material poverty. 
 In the context of ongoing global financial crises, the invidious position of this 
group has intensified. A new politics of austerity has combined with the politics of 
aspiration, which in the UK the Coalition Government has inherited from Labour and 
repackaged, raising the stakes for those who are unable to find an entrepreneurial way 
through hard economic times and the disastrous consequences of the close 
relationship between nation-states and finance capital (Helms, Vishmidt & Berlant, 
2010; Marazzi, 2010). In this context, promises of social mobility through education 
are becoming harder to keep. However, in Australia a mining resources boom led by 
demand from China has so far enabled it to survive the global financial crises better 
than most countries. This has helped to sustain human capital investment through 
educational expansion while providing visible social mobility for a few who are 
benefiting from high paying jobs in the mining sector. However, while some fractions 
of the working class are presented as exemplary, based on the social mobility they 
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have achieved through education and entrepreneurialism, the desires of this latter 
group have been criticised despite their economic success. This issue is taken up again 
later in the paper. 
 
 
Raising aspiration for Australian higher education 
 
There has been a significant expansion and equity agenda in Australian higher 
education since the release of the Review of Australian Higher Education in 2008 
(Commonwealth of Australia, 2008) and the Australian Government’s (2009) policy 
response in 2009. Equity in Australian higher education is currently conceived as 
proportional representation for groups who are identified as disadvantaged, and the 
current focus is on students from low SES backgrounds. Low SES is determined on 
the basis of residence at the time of enrolment, in a geographical area of Australia that 
ranks in the lowest 25% of areas according to the Australian Bureau of Statistics.1 
Equitable participation is defined as 25% of all students currently participating in the 
system having resided in these areas when they enrolled. Over the past two decades 
the participation rate of students from low SES backgrounds has stagnated at around 
15% system-wide (Australian Government, 2009), although institution-specific 
participation rates vary markedly across universities. Two issues are important to note 
in relation to the current emphasis on SES. First, it has tended to divert attention from 
other forms of inequity, including gender and racial inequities. Second, the concept of 
SES displaces the language of class and tends to individualise disadvantage and its 
‘solutions’. 
 The Australian Government (2009) has set national targets to increase the 
numbers of Australians holding Bachelor’s qualifications (40% of 25–34 year olds by 
2025) and the participation rate for people from low SES backgrounds (20% by 
2020). In 2012, the government uncapped the number of publically funded places for 
domestic students in undergraduate programs, aiming to create a system driven by 
student demand and anticipating that, in turn, this demand would drive expansion 
(Sellar, Gale, & Parker, 2011). From 2012 to 2015 the Australian Government has 
committed more than $700 million to increase the low SES participation rate through 
its Higher Education Participation and Partnerships Program (HEPPP), including 
more than $200 million of competitive funding for projects designed to raise 
aspirations for university study. This commitment follows a recommendation made in 
the Review, which identified an ‘aspiration gap’ between students in the top and 
bottom quartiles of socio-economic status. It argued that this presents a significant 
obstacle to increasing the participation of those at the bottom: ‘Barriers to access for 
such students include their previous educational attainment, no awareness of the long-
term benefits of higher education and, thus, no aspiration to participate’ 
(Commonwealth of Australia, 2008, p. 27). 
 The Review draws on Organisation of Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD, 2008, p. 60) data and analyses that recommend school-based interventions to 
redress the fact that ‘students whose parents have lower levels of education 
underestimate more often the net benefits of tertiary education’. ‘Aspiration gaps’ are 
here linked to ‘information gaps’ that contribute to the reduced likelihood of people 
from low SES backgrounds engaging in what is considered to be rational behaviour: 
that is, the pursuit of higher education to gain positional advantage in the global 
labour market. Following this logic, the government aims to ‘enable Australia to 
participate fully in, and benefit from, the global knowledge economy. … In that 
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process the nation must provide educational opportunity for all, not just the few’ 
(Australian Government, 2009, p. 5). This agenda links the project of improving 
equity for individuals, by raising their awareness about the benefits of higher 
education, to the project of increasing national economic productivity and 
competitiveness. Accordingly, the Higher Education Participation and Partnerships 
Program (HEPPP) has been designed ‘to create leading practice and competitive 
pressures to increase the aspirations of low SES students to higher education’ by 
providing ‘schools and vocational education and training providers with links to 
universities, exposing their students to people, places and opportunities beyond the 
scope of their own experiences, helping teachers raise the aspirations of their students’ 
(Australian Government, 2009, p. 14). In 2011, the HEPPP provided competitive 
funding for eleven projects and these predominantly involved universities 
(individually or in consortia) working with secondary schools to increase students’ 
awareness about higher education and to help improve levels of educational 
achievement. 
 The current emphasis on aspiration brings together social justice impulses and 
commitments to neoliberal economic policy settings and forms of governmentality. It 
inherits directly from ‘Third Way’ social democratic policy positions proposed by 
Mark Latham a decade ago.2   In his writing on education policy, Latham introduced 
the notion of ‘aspirational equality’, which he defined as a condition ‘in which all 
individuals and institutions are able to fulfil their potential, according to their own 
values and aspirations’ (2001, p. 22). While retaining an emphasis on economic 
mobility for the working class, Latham argued that, under the conditions of neoliberal 
globalisation, the pursuit of economic self-interest within markets is the most 
appropriate means to realise this end, rather than what he argued were out-dated forms 
of redistribution. According to Latham, ‘[e]very learner and every institution needs to 
be given the freedom to achieve their aspirations’ (2001, pp. 22–23). In this view, the 
role of government is to remove any obstacles to aspirations, while providing targeted 
funding to help people realise them. 
 The concept of aspirational equality presupposes beliefs about human behaviour 
and the role of government that are central to the social imaginary of neoliberal 
globalization. Aspirational equality relies on a ‘conception of society as constituted by 
self-maximising individuals with the free capacity to choose, as well as a conception 
of government as necessarily inimical to individual interests’ (Rizvi & Lingard, 2010, 
p. 87). In this view, justice is potentially ‘compromised because of the perennial 
desire of governments to redistribute wealth that is never theirs and to seek to control 
human affairs that are best left to individual discretion’ (Rizvi & Lingard, 2010, pp. 
87–88). Aspiration is often presented as an innate property of individuals that is more 
likely to be hindered than helped by government intervention. 
 Latham (2003) argues that aspiration is spurred by previous success in market 
competition and the desire to emulate the successes of others. For example, he heralds 
a new era of aspiration that has emerged as a result of previous economic mobility for 
the working class, spurred in Australia by the provision of greater educational 
opportunities during the 1970s and market reforms in the 1980s: ‘The workers have 
had a taste of economic ownership and, not surprisingly, they want more. … Mobility 
the likes of which we have never seen before is fuelling further aspiration’ (Latham, 
2003, p. 67). The fraction of the working class who now aspire—the ‘aspirationals’—
have enjoyed mobility in conditions of market competition and this has left them 
wanting more; those who have not, require better information about what they are 
missing. Here we can see how a supposed poverty of aspiration is configured as a lack 
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of information about how to gain advantage in markets. Making this information 
available and providing people with a taste of success can ‘unleash’ previously 
fettered aspirations and drive social mobility. 
 However, neoliberal theory recognises that individuals cannot be relied upon to 
engage in market behaviour in relation to higher education. Marginson (1993, p. 2) 
observes that ‘market behaviours in higher education … are neither ‘natural’ nor 
inevitable’ and ‘[e]conomic identities are a product of their context … these identities 
can be constructed—not only by market forces but by deliberate policy’. He refers to 
Hayek’s (1979, p. 76) argument that market competition produces market-rational 
behaviour, rather than this behaviour being the precondition for market competition. 
The success of a few entrepreneurs in markets compels others to behave in a rational 
manner. A number of implications follow from this argument. First, as Marginson 
(1993) notes, this behaviour, and the dispositions that animate it, must be actively 
cultivated. Second, raising aspiration among those who ‘lack the spirit of enterprise’ 
requires the example of an elite few who have gained advantage in markets (Hayek, 
1979, p. 76). Finally, contexts where advantage seeking actions of the elite are subject 
to contestation or prohibition by others are inimical to markets and the entrepreneurial 
spirit: 
 
If in a society in which the spirit of enterprise has not yet spread, the majority has power to 
prohibit whatever it dislikes, it is most unlikely that it will allow competition to arise. I doubt 
whether a functioning market has ever newly arisen under an unlimited democracy, and it 
seems at least likely that unlimited democracy will destroy it where it has grown up. (Hayek 
1979, p. 77, emphasis added) 
 
In this view, aspiration is animated by competition that provides a few with 
disproportionate rewards and thereby stimulates desire among the many. If the many 
are able to prohibit this behaviour then they also risk suffocating the aspirational 
spirit. There is an evident tension here between the logic of aspiration-raising and the 
equity objectives it is being mobilised to serve in current Australian higher education 
policy. Aspiration is presented as a force for social mobility and redistribution, yet the 
neoliberal principles on which this logic of aspiration draws clearly apprehend that it 
can only be sustained under conditions of market competition that necessarily produce 
relative advantage and disadvantage. 
 
 
The false promises of aspiration 
 
Aspirations are formed in relation to a set of promises about the future. Berlant (2011, 
p. 23) suggests that objects of our desire comprise ‘a cluster of promises we want 
something or someone to make to us and make possible for us’. These promises 
operate affectively, as well as at the level of conscious intentionality, and are 
imbricated in the ongoing production of subjectivities. For example, multiple and 
contradictory promises may cluster around higher education as an object of desire, 
with very different implications for senses of self and relations to others: for example, 
the promise of economic mobility might be coupled with the promise of losing a sense 
of belonging to family and peers; a loss that is often overlooked in discussions about 
what is gained through higher education. Attachment to these promises can give rise 
to a relation of ‘cruel optimism’, which ‘exists when something you desire is actually 
an obstacle to your flourishing’ (Berlant, 2011, p. 1): 
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What’s cruel about these attachments, and not merely inconvenient or tragic, is that the 
subjects who have x in their lives might not well endure the loss of their object/scene of desire, 
even though its presence threatens their well-being, because whatever the content of the 
attachment is, the continuity of the form of it provides something of the continuity of the 
subject’s sense of what it means to keep on living on and to look forward to being in the 
world. (Berlant, 2011, p. 24, emphasis in original) 
 
Contrary to ‘poverty of desire’ theses, investments in objects of desire that promise a 
‘good life’, however diversely this might be conceived, sustain most of us much of the 
time. The project of constructing market-competitive aspirations—a ‘spirit of 
enterprise’—entails the potential displacement of objects that sustain senses of 
identity and meaning for people whose lives are not currently animated by the project 
of increasing their value as human capital. This symbolic violence inherent in the 
cultivation of desire is rarely mentioned in aspiration-raising agendas. 
 Evidence also suggests that relationships between educational attainment and 
global labour markets promised by the ‘neoliberal opportunity bargain’ (Brown et al., 
2010) are changing, and this bargain may now be creating objects of desire that 
sustain people in hopeful anticipation, across both middle and working class locations, 
while quietly undermining their socio-economic position. Brown et al. (2010, pp. 7–9) 
identify three dynamics at work in what they describe as an ‘opportunity trap’: 
credential inflation as a result of expansion in global higher education provision; a 
‘quality-cost revolution’ that is driving down the costs of high skill work while 
sustaining or even improving the quality of what is produced; and a ‘global war for 
talent’ in which corporations are competing for a small, elite cohort of workers, 
despite many others holding equivalent educational qualifications (see also Brown & 
Tannock, 2009). As a result, human capital and global knowledge economy rationales 
that underpin economic and education policy in countries like the US, UK and 
Australia appear increasingly flawed. The belief that these nations are best positioned 
to attract high skill jobs is being challenged by the emergence of economies such as 
China, which in some areas is now able to provide equivalent skills and quality at 
lower prices. Further, assumptions about the individual payoffs for human capital 
investment, in terms of employability and economic mobility, are being placed in 
question by the falling value of higher education as a positional good. Brown et al. 
(2010) argue that ‘[e]xpectations of middle-class lifestyles, fuelled by the rise of mass 
higher education, have sucked more people into already congested labour markets. … 
the supply of aspirants greatly outstrips employer demand for their services’ (p. 12). 
Raising aspiration is a fragile technology of government in this context. 
 However, a small working class fraction in Australia has managed to side-step this 
opportunity trap by finding employment in the currently lucrative mining sector. Yet, 
this group often still find themselves positioned in deficit terms by the politics of 
aspiration. Pejoratively described as ‘cashed-up bogans’, these workers have 
experienced significant economic mobility in recent years. In Australia, ‘bogan’ is a 
derogatory stereotype in popular culture applied to the white lower working class, 
similar to the use of the term ‘chav’ in the UK (see Jones, 2011). ‘Cashed-up bogans’ 
(‘Cubs’), like the ‘aspirationals’ before them, are popularly identified in terms of their 
conspicuous consumption practices: ‘the Cub emerged in a very particular economic 
context of a resource boom and skill shortage which allowed the seemingly 
impossible—that is, the opportunity to be financially well rewarded for manual 
labour’ (Pini, Mcdonald, & Mayes, 2012, p. 12). Like certain fractions of the working 
class in post-industrial Britain, this group has avoided the most severe effects of the 
decline in manufacturing industries, but occupies an uneasy place between working 
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and middle class cultures (for example, see Nayak, 2006, for a discussion of ‘Real 
Geordies’ and their positioning in north-east Britain). The ‘cashed-up bogan’ has been 
subject to considerable criticism in Australian popular culture and the media, focusing 
on their lack of education and thus perceived lack of entitlement to the considerable 
remuneration they receive, as well as their poor cultural ‘taste’ (Pini et al., 2012). This 
group is also now buying residential property in leafy urban areas that have long been 
the preserve of the middle-class, thus using ‘their economic capital to transgress a 
multitude of middle-class spatial boundaries and [this has] consequently destabilized 
class-based ontologies of belonging and place’ (Pini et al., 2012, p. 12). Here we can 
see how aspirations for economic mobility have led to perceptions that the ‘wrong’ 
people now occupy the ‘wrong’ places. 
 This receipt of significant financial reward for manual labour is limited to a 
relatively small group who have specific sets of skills and qualifications. However, it 
illustrates that demonstrating the ‘spirit of enterprise’ is not necessarily enough to be 
considered appropriately aspirational. The logic of market competition suggests that 
this group deserve esteem and imitation for successfully exploiting high demand for 
the skill-sets they possess and for their willingness to undertake shift-work at mine 
sites in remote locations; however, they are often popularly represented as greedy 
individualists whose crass tastes present a threat to middle-class values (Pini et al., 
2012). The politics of aspiration seeks to cultivate economic desires, but at the same 
time these desires are policed according to class and cultural norms. Aspiration is 
‘unleashed’ with one hand and ‘policed’ with the other. According to Hayek (1979), 
the ‘spirit of enterprise’ cannot endure the constraints of ‘unlimited democracy’; 
however, this is not simply because the majority might prohibit the productive 
behaviour of the elite, but because, in practice, the elite reserve the right to judge and 
reform certain behaviours among the majority. This assumed power to determine 
‘appropriate’ desires, and to propagate them throughout society, is explicitly manifest 
in concerns to elevate the desires of the working class for their own good, from the 
creation of didactic socialist fiction in early nineteenth century England to the 
cultivation of desire through university outreach activities in contemporary Australia. 
 One reading of Hayek’s point regarding the risk of ‘unlimited democracy’ for 
markets would be to emphasise the problems it presents for the cadre of elites who 
have carefully regulated and exploited markets in their own self-interest (Harvey, 
2005). However, Hayek emphasises that, for market competition to be possible, no 
group can retain the right to impose its view on how others ought or ought not to 
behave (Hayek, 1979, p. 76). There are tensions here between the manifestation of 
this neoliberal ideal in the contemporary politics of aspiration and the longstanding 
cultural politics of desire. The neoliberal position contends that ‘unlimited 
democracy’ risks prohibiting the spirit of enterprise necessary for a small group to 
gain advantage from and promote competitive behaviour (Hayek, 1979). At the same 
time, enterprising behaviour among the working class is itself presented as a form of 
‘unlimited democracy’ that threatens the proper functioning of society (Ranciere, 
2006). While desire for higher education is now cultivated according to a promised 
relationship between learning and earning, the aspirations of groups who disrupt the 
rules of this game by obtaining the latter without the former are seen to be crass, 
disruptive and in need of further cultivation. 
 Rizvi and Lingard (2010) argue that the neoliberal imaginary ‘has given rise to a 
range of contradictions that can no longer be ignored’ (p. 91) and here it is possible to 
discern one such contradiction at the intersection of neoliberal ideals and class 
politics. There is a tension in the logic of raising aspiration between economic 
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rationales for cultivating the enterprising spirit and cultural distinctions between 
‘high’ and ‘low’ aspirations, between ‘right’ and wrong’ forms of enterprising 
behaviour. In this respect, the most properly neoliberal approach to aspiration-raising 
would be to retain the injunction to cultivate an enterprising spirit while refraining 
from prescribing appropriate objects of aspiration. However, this is not to suggest that 
a ‘purer’ realisation of neoliberal ideals is required. Rather, the important issue here is 
that the ‘neoliberal opportunity bargain’ (Brown et al., 2010) and aspiration-raising 
logics operate in conjunction and contradiction with longstanding, anti-democratic 
class politics through which some groups arrogate to themselves responsibility for the 
aspirations of others.  
 
 
Conclusion and discussion 
 
[P]olitics in its entirety is accounted for by an anthropology that knows but one opposition: 
that between an adult humanity faithful to tradition, which it institutes as such, and a childish 
humanity whose dream of engendering itself anew leads to self-destruction. (Ranciere, 2006, 
p. 28) 
 
For over a century, the dreams of the working class in Britain and Australia have been 
considered potentially disruptive to the proper functioning of society and in need of 
reform by those who know better. While ‘poverty of desire’ theses have evolved 
under conditions of neoliberal globalisation, the belief of the political class in the need 
to reform working class desire has not. Contemporary Australian higher education 
policy aims to raise aspiration for the good of individuals and the nation, combining 
aims to provide more equitable access to university places and to increase economic 
productivity and competitiveness. To this end, the Australian government is providing 
substantial funding for projects that, among other objectives, seek to promote higher 
education by making promises that sustain people in an optimistic relation to future 
education and employment opportunities, and expectations of social mobility. 
However, the ‘opportunity trap’ identified by Brown et al. (2010) holds troubling 
implications for this equity agenda, which risks inflating expectations to levels that 
cannot be met, even if it succeeds in its own terms by increasing the participation rate 
of students from low SES backgrounds. Increasing the number of people who have 
access to higher education is an important equity objective in itself, because it 
provides numerous non-economic benefits regardless of changing employment 
prospects. However, Brown et al. (2010) remind us that Australia’s higher education 
policies must also be evaluated in relation to contemporary global developments. 
Global markets will not necessarily deliver the rewards that national governments 
promise to their citizens. 
 The politics of aspiration animating this agenda draws on neoliberal logics and 
assumes that many working class groups lack appropriate knowledge to make 
decisions about futures that are in their best interests. The solution is to provide these 
groups with information and incentives that encourage the market-rational behaviour 
of participating in higher education and investing in themselves as human capital. The 
current policy ensemble combines its equity objectives with two market objectives: 
(a) increasing demand for higher education during an expansionary phase by (b) 
cultivating the competitive ‘cast of thinking’ required to sustain activity in higher 
education markets. Aspiration-raising policies and programs are thus one means 
through which the social imaginary of neoliberal globalisation is being partially 
(re)produced through equity policy in Australian education. 
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 However, this politics of aspiration also harbours tensions that cannot be ignored. 
While the cultivation of aspiration accords with ideal logics of market competition, 
the contempt directed toward groups who hold ‘uncultivated’ aspirations creates 
expectations about the behaviour of others that Hayek (1979) argues are inimical to 
markets. The politics of aspiration is conjoined with a particular form of ‘police’ order 
(Ranciere, 2006, p. 47): that is, ‘practices of authority based on this or that 
distribution of places and capabilities’. This order institutes and sustains distinctions 
between ‘high’ and ‘low’ aspirations based on cultural norms—indeed, it makes 
certain desires ‘visible’ as ‘aspiration’ while rendering others ‘invisible’— and 
confers on those with appropriate expertise (i.e. technocrats) the task of establishing 
what is in the best interests of all. ‘Low’ aspirations are ‘raised’ as a means for 
increasing access to educational and economic goods, but the benefits of this access 
are deferred to a promised future. There is an essential temporal delay in this logic 
that maintains the authority of those making the promises. Some groups who 
circumvent this delay find themselves on the wrong side of the police order; criticised 
and ridiculed on cultural grounds despite their economic success. Groups who enter 
the meritocratic competition of education endure the temporal delay, in which the 
value of higher education as a positional good can decrease and new strategies for 
gaining advantage in labour markets can emerge, and therefore risk finding 
themselves in a relation of ‘cruel optimism’ as they wait in perpetual hope for the 
‘good life’ to come. 
 Over a century ago, John Burns (1902, p. 13) lamented that the poverty of desire 
among the working class would ensure that ‘all the predictions of the enemies of 
Democracy will be justified’. In contrast, Ranciere (2006) proposes that the policing 
of desire according to socialist ideals is equally likely to satisfy the enemies of 
democracy: 
 
Demands for democracy were for a long time carried or concealed by the idea of a new 
society, the elements of which were allegedly being formed in the very heart of contemporary 
society. That is what ‘socialism’ designated: a vision of history according to which capitalist 
forms of production and exchange constituted the material conditions for an egalitarian society 
and its worldwide expansion. Understanding what democracy means is to renounce this faith. 
The collective intelligence produced by a system of domination is only ever the intelligence of 
that system. (Ranciere, 2006, p. 96) 
 
Raising aspiration for higher education partakes in a vision according to which a more 
egalitarian society can be produced from and through capitalist relations. While it 
could provide people from low SES backgrounds with a more equitable share of 
educational goods, the purposes for the distribution of these goods have already been 
decided. The politics of aspiration still involves the architects of egalitarian society 
extending to others an invitation to participate in their vision. 
 It is not the purpose of this paper to attempt to resolve the tensions in current 
aspiration-raising equity agendas. Indeed, to do so would risk adding another ideal 
vision as a corrective to those that have been promoted over the past hundred years. 
Instead, I will conclude with a question: Can we support the aspirations of others 
without imposing ideals that police desire? Experimenting in response to this question 
might make a small contribution towards the emergence of ‘unlimited democracy’; 
that is, the emergence of political events in which all are considered equal in their 
capacities for thought and are encouraged to engage these capacities in the task of 
imagining what is in our collective best interests, whatever risks this might hold for 
market competition and practices of authority based on people knowing their place. 
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Endnotes 
 
1 Since 2009 the Australian Government has been combining this area-based measure with the number 
of students receiving specified government benefit payments to determine low SES. The specific 
formula is to multiply the number of students from low SES areas by two, add the number of students 
receiving specified Centrelink payments, and then divide this total figure by three. 
2 Latham’s (2001) book on education policy was titled What did you learn today? Creating an 
education revolution. The Australian Labor Government elected in 2007 announced an ‘education 
revolution’ in its 2008 Quality Education: The case for an education revolution in our schools 
(Commonwealth of Australia 2008), and a ‘tertiary education revolution’ in Transforming Australia’s 
higher education system (Australian Government, 2009). Each of these documents mobilise a third-
way logic of weaving together economic productivity and social responsibility through education 
policy. 
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